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ARTICLES

BARNETT NEWMAN’S
“SENSE OF SPACE”
A Noncontextualist Account of Its Perception and Meaning

Michael Schreyach

Dorothy Seckler: How would you define your sense of space?
Barnett Newman: . . . Is space where the orifices are in the faces of people
talking to each other, or is it not [also] between the glance of their eyes
as they respond to each other? Anyone standing in front of my paintings must feel the vertical domelike vaults encompass him [in order]
to awaken an awareness of his being alive in the sensation of complete
space. This is the opposite of creating an environment. . . . This is the
only real sensation of space.1

Some of the titles that Barnett Newman gave to his paintings are deceptively simple: Here and Now, Right Here, Not There — Here. Straightforwardly, they seem to
announce that the content of his work — its meaning — is available to anyone, to
any viewer, who feels him- or herself positioned, in space and time, while beholdThe author wishes to thank Claude Cernuschi, David
Raskin, Aron Vinegar, Todd Cronan, Charles Palermo,
Harry Cooper, and the editors of Common Knowledge. The
essay is dedicated to the memory of Charles Harrison.

York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1990), 249 – 50, hereafter cited as
BN:SWI.

1. Barnett Newman, “ ‘Frontiers of Space’: Interview
with Dorothy Gees Seckler” (1962), in Barnett Newman:
Selected Writings and Interviews, ed. John P. O’Neill (New
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ing Newman’s art.2 The artist often spoke of his desire to establish for viewers of
his paintings a tangible sensation of space, one that would give them a feeling of
being present at a particular time and place. That “sense of place, a sense of being
there” was integrally related to Newman’s sense of scale, a term he used to designate “the real problem of a painting.”3 “Size doesn’t count,” he explained. “It’s
scale that counts. It’s human scale that counts, and the only way you can achieve
human scale is by content.”4 For Newman, space, (human) scale, and content were
bound to each other. Together, they constituted the “totality” of painting that he
strove to create.5 This totality is not simple either to apprehend or to interpret.
The totality of a painting is not given (as if automatically conveyed by the canvas
to a passive viewer) but must be achieved (as if consummated by a viewer’s act of
acknowledgment). It comes as no surprise that Newman believed strongly in the
ethical component of this reciprocal engagement between painting and beholder.
What is surprising, though, is the tendency of scholars to generalize about this
structure of beholding. Lacking are specific accounts about how each individual
painting technically works (or does not work) to establish the assumed relationship. Additionally, interpreting in each case the precise mode of that relationship —
determining its qualitative outlines, finding out what it is like and how it creatively determines one’s experience of oneself and others — is an important part
of interpreting the meaning of Newman’s art.
While contemporary scholarship on Newman continues to offer valuable
interpretations of his ideas, explores his influence on a younger generation of
artists, and investigates his technical processes, a significant challenge remains
in developing more precise accounts of how particular works of art realize the
perceptual experiences that the artist intended them to realize and that he so passionately insisted on.6 This undertaking will surely be galvanized by the recent

2. See Richard Shiff, Carol C. Mancusi-Ungaro, and
Heidi Colsman-Freyberger, Barnett Newman: A Catalogue
Raisonné (New York: Barnett Newman Foundation; New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004), hereafter BNF.
Newman often chose titles that suggest this aspect of the
viewer’s felt experience of being located, in the present,
facing his works: Moment (1946 [BNF 7]); Be I (1949 [BNF
34]); Right Here (1954 [BNF 65]); Not There — Here (1962
[BNF 81]); Now I (1965 [BNF 96]) and Now II (1967 [BNF
102]); The Moment I (1962 [BNF 82]) and The Moment II
(1962 [BNF 113]); and Be I (Second Version) (1970 [BNF
116]).
3. Newman, “The Case for ‘Exporting’ Nation’s Avant-
Garde Art: Interview with Andrew Hudson” (1966), in
BN:SWI, 273, 272.
4. Newman, “Interview with Emile de Antonio” (1970),
in BN:SWI, 307.
5. Newman, “Interview with Emile de Antonio,” in
BN:SWI, 306

6. Much recent scholarship was stimulated by the
Newman retrospective exhibition at the Philadelphia
Museum of Art in 2002. See Ann Temkin, Barnett Newman (Philadelphia: Philadelphia Museum of Art, 2002),
which includes Temkin, “Barnett Newman on Exhibition” (18 – 75), and Richard Shiff, “Whiteout: The Not-
Influence Newman Effect” (76–111). A group of scholarly
essays from a symposium on the occasion of the retrospective are assembled in Melissa Ho, ed., Reconsidering Barnett Newman (Philadelphia: Philadelphia Museum of Art,
2002). Although I am critical of aspects of his account,
Yve-A lain Bois’s work stands as a model for those attempting to describe the look and effects of Newman’s work. See
“Perceiving Newman” in Bois, Painting as Model (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990), 186 – 211; “Newman’s
Laterality,” in Ho, Reconsidering Barnett Newman, 29–45;
and “On Two Paintings by Barnett Newman [Abraham
and Galaxy],” October 108 (2004): 3 – 34. Mark Godfrey
has recently offered a close account of facing a group of

Newman’s paintings (“Barnett Newman’s Stations and the
Memory of the Holocaust,” October 108 [2004]: 35–50), as
Sarah K. Rich does throughout her dissertation (“Seriality and Difference in the Late Work of Barnett Newman”
[PhD diss., Yale University, 1999]).
7. See Shiff, Mancusi-Ungaro, and Colsman-Freyberger,
BN:SWI. The catalog includes a substantive essay by
Shiff, “To Create Oneself” (2 – 115), as well as groundbreaking technical analyses by Mancusi-Ungaro, “The
Paintings of Barnett Newman: ‘Involved Intuition on the
Highest Level’ ” (116–42).
8. The problem is not limited to Newman’s case but
is pervasive in the field of art history, where there has
been for some time a tendency to focus on the viewer
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publication of Newman’s catalogue raisonné, an authoritative resource and reference point for those wishing to supplement their descriptions and interpretations
of actual canvases with details from Newman’s exhibition history and materials,
and in light of additional items from his oeuvre.7 Indeed, it might be argued
that it is primarily by descriptively clarifying the perceptual experiences solicited by Newman’s paintings that we can be more precise about their intended
effects — about what Newman wanted us to perceive.
When I write of Newman’s intentional modes of pictorial address, I
include the viewer’s participation in being addressed — the viewer’s willingness
to acknowledge the ways or modes by which the paintings solicit one’s attention
and constrain one’s responses en route to conveying the meanings that Newman
intended to convey. My assertion that the meaning of Newman’s art is a matter
of his intention will be met with skepticism on the part of readers who have come
to doubt the heuristic value of intentionality in establishing art historical understanding. Some readers have come to believe that meaning is produced through
the contingent contexts in which individuals encounter an artist’s work or else
that meaning is to be found in experiences that result from such encounters.
Here, the problem is not only one of deciding between what is of interest in the
interpretation of art (a particular viewer’s experiences in some context, or what
an artist intended a viewer to experience regardless of context) but also, and more
importantly, one of determining what is methodologically relevant in making
claims about what artworks mean.
In Newman’s case, scholars have ample access to the artist’s own views
about the meaning of his art, and much interpretation has been guided by finding a match between what Newman claimed he was after and what his paintings
mean as a whole. The tendency to privilege and to defer to Newman’s statements
as the normative ground of interpretation has in some respects impeded attempts
to educe his intentions by other means: we should attend instead, or first, to how
his paintings appear to the beholder that the artist anticipated.8 It may very well

or beholder as the source of meaning, at the expense of
the author (one thinks of Roland Barthes’s crucial essay
of 1967, “The Death of the Author,” as partly inaugurating this shift). What seems to matter is not what the
author or artist intended some text or painting to mean
but what kinds of experiences a text or painting creates
for the reader or viewer. And because, from this point of
view, meaning is found in the individual’s particular experience, what also begins to matter is who that individual is
and where or when it is that he or she encounters the work.
Which is to say that the meaning of the artwork becomes a
matter of identity and context rather than authorial intention. (Recent panels dedicated to these issues have been
held at the 2010 College Art Association annual meeting
[“Intention/Identity/Interpretation,” chaired by Todd
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turn out to be the case that Newman’s modes of pictorial address convey the
kinds of content or meaning that he articulated in his writings and interviews
(indeed, I think they do), but the account of how they do so should rest on a close
examination and analysis of how the paintings in question address a viewer and
not, or not simply, on the artist’s testimony.
Moreover, such a phenomenological approach to describing modes of pictorial address may help correct the frequent overreliance on context (whether social,
cultural, biographical, political, or intellectual) as the determining framework for
interpretation.9 The complexity of perceiving Newman’s works, as well as that
of his contemporaries (one thinks especially of Jackson Pollock), is not always
acknowledged with a depth and thoroughness commensurate to individual paintings. Their works are often presented as mere tokens — any “Newman” or “Pollock” will do to illustrate a general point — rather than as the irreducibly unique
paintings that they are. From an art historical perspective that acknowledges
the specificity of artworks, the works themselves constitute the most compelling
form of primary evidence available to ground interpretation.10 Methodologically,
this approach would mean stemming the general drift of scholarship in art history toward belief in context as the final authority for telling us anything about
artworks (and consequently away from finding out what artworks tell us about
any particular context).11

Cronan and Charles Palermo] and the 2010 Southeastern College Art Conference [“Who Cares Who Sees?,”
chaired by Cronan with a response by Palermo]. For the
general orientation adopted by these organizers, see Walter
Benn Michaels and Steven Knapp, Against Theory 2: Sentence Meaning, Hermeneutics [Berkeley, CA: Center for Hermeneutical Studies, 1986], and Michaels, The Shape of the
Signifier: 1967 to the End of History [Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004], esp. 1–18.) In the present argument, I am attempting to say something about Newman’s
intentions not just by citing his writings and statements
(although I do so repeatedly) but by educing them through
the particular ways his paintings appear to a beholder.
9. Newman (1905 – 70) and the phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908 – 61) were of the same generation. Without making any claims for influence, I would
note that both attempted, in their own ways, to resist
and negate the conventional conceptions governing our
understanding of perception and representation. For
Merleau-Ponty, doing so meant bracketing our “natural”
or “scientific” attitude, which he thought was generated by
powerful, but suspect, theoretical presuppositions about
how we perceive the world. For Newman, doing so meant
suspending powerful cultural presuppositions about how
paintings represent the world, and it meant as well investigating the nature and content of representational practices
as they had been established in the history of painting.

10. My orientation to the specificity of intended effects
is deeply informed by Charles Harrison, “Disorder and
Insensitivity: The Concept of Experience in Abstract
Expressionist Painting,” in American Abstract Expressionism, ed. David Thistlewood (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1993), 111–28.
11. Newman himself often questioned the authority of
context, and regularly asserted the creative power of the
artist over any constraints of culture or even language, as
his famous exchange with Erwin Panofsky over the title
of Vir Heroicus Sublimis makes clear. The title translates
roughly as “man heroic and lofty,” by which Newman
meant “that man can be or is sublime in his relation to his
sense of being aware” (Newman, “Interview with David
Sylvester” [1965], in BN:SWI, 258). Panofsky had written
a letter to the editor of Art News complaining about the
classical education of modern artists after coming across
what he thought was a misuse of the word sublimus (spelled
with a “u”) in the caption for Newman’s painting. (For the
exchange, which took place between April and September
1961, see Newman and Panofsky, “Letters to the Editor
[Replies to Erwin Panofsky],” Art News [1961], in BN:SWI,
216–20.) Even though the misspelling had been the result
of a typographical error, Newman — with characteristic
confidence — responded by correcting Panofsky’s Latin.
In his reply to Newman, Panofsky rehearsed the rules of

The artwork is the occasion neither for open-ended “experience” nor for unwarranted subjectivity, and The Wild functions to radically undermine indeterminate
responses and projections.
Because The Wild achieves a high degree of independence from conventional notions of the pictorial field as a phenomenon of lateral extension, it resists
a viewer’s customary expectation to enter imaginatively into that field. Instead,
the complex visual and kinesthetic dynamics created for the viewer by the
painting — combined with the palpable sensation of the work’s integrity as an
object distinct from the viewer — establishes a mode of pictorial address that I
will refer to as “facingness.” (Newman often drew an analogy between seeing a
painting and meeting or facing another person for the first time, an important
usage concerning sublimis and sublimus, noting that the
latter should be used only literally, while the former (the
word in Newman’s title) could also be used metaphorically. According to Panofsky, sublimus properly applies
to “concrete objects or phenomena occupying an elevated position in space,” such as on a mountain summit
or in the sky. Although Panofsky essentially apologized to
Newman for criticizing the painter on the basis of an editorial typo, Newman thought he did so disingenuously by
changing the basis of his criticism from grammar to style
and so continued to debate Panofsky, arguing that sublimus was a legitimate alternate spelling for sublimis. While
noting that sublimus vertex could mean “the lofty crown
of a man’s skull,” he blasted Panofsky for “attempt[ing] to
deny the artist’s right to create poetic language.”
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Accordingly, what I offer here is a close account of three paintings — The
Wild (1950 [BNF 48]), Vir Heroicus Sublimis (1950 [BNF 47]), and Untitled 2,
1950 (BNF 40) — in an effort to describe how, perceptually, Newman conveys
his “sense of space.”12 Investigating the mode of pictorial address established by
Newman in The Wild — one of a series of narrow paintings he made in 1950, and
his most insistently “vertical” work — can illuminate substantially the dynamics
of apprehending the artist’s sense of space in general but particularly with regard
to what many consider to be his most significant painting, and one of the most
“horizontal,” Vir Heroicus Sublimis. Ultimately, my aim is to interpret what that
space means — what kind of value it is meant to have or to hold. First, though, we
need to determine, broadly in phenomenological terms, how The Wild appears to
a viewer. Accounting for the way the painting is perceived is a necessary component of discerning the intentionality behind Newman’s mode of pictorial address.
I assume that there are certain relationships that an artist intends to establish
between the beholder of a painting and a painting (I agree with Michael Fried
that the primordial convention of paintings is that they are made to be beheld).13

12. Color images of this painting and all of the other
works of Newman discussed in this article are available
online at www.moma.org (The Wild, Vir Heroicus Sublimis,
Onement I); www.centrepompidou.fr ( Jericho); www.ste
delijk.nl (Cathedra, Who’s Afraid of Red, Yellow and Blue III);
www.kawamura-museum.dic.co.jp (Anna’s Light). They
can be found with a basic image search on www.google
.com as well.
13. In terms of its emphasis on the ontological specificity
of such relationships, Fried’s work is exemplary. Among
his works, see Absorption and Theatricality: Painting and
Beholder in the Age of Diderot (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980) and Manet’s Modernism, or, The Face
of Painting in the 1860s (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1996). For a helpful elucidation of the philosophical
stakes of Fried’s project, see Robert Pippin, “Authenticity in Painting: Remarks on Michael Fried’s Art History,”
Critical Inquiry 31, no. 3 (2005): 575–98.
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relation to which it will be worth returning.) Untitled 2, 1950, another of the thin
vertical works, is meant to convey an impression of “fittingness” that contributes
to the viewer’s sense of integrity and autonomy as a subject, encountering the
painting as if it were another subject to which he or she may respond. As for Vir
Heroicus Sublimis, it offers an occasion to consider competing interpretations to
my own of Newman’s mode of pictorial address and to evaluate their implications
for understanding some of his primary concerns, including individuality (or “self-
evidence”) and the relationship of self and other.

Newman’s Verticality
In 1950, Newman made a series of six paintings of unusual dimensions. None of
the works is wider than six inches, but the canvases range from three to nearly
eight feet in height.14 In Newman’s catalogue raisonné, the untitled paintings
are listed numerically according to a scheme (suggested by Thomas Hess after
Newman’s death) that orders the canvases according to height, from shortest to
tallest. Their ratios of height to width range from 6:1 to an extreme of 64:1.15 At
just over an inch and a half wide but eight feet high, The Wild most exaggerates
the dimensional disparities shared by the group. Newman maximized its vertical
dimension to create a format that compromised all but the most minimal notions
of lateral or horizontal extension. There are at least two consequences of Newman’s strategy. First, when confronting The Wild (and to a lesser extent the other
five narrow vertical canvases), viewers are asked to abandon their conventional
notions of a pictorial “field” understood either (1) as the lateral dimensions of an
upright plane parallel to the viewer’s standing body or (2) as a fictional or metaphorical space oriented to the viewer as a horizontal expanse and imaginatively
accessible to a penetrating view.
Newman’s motivation for vertically elongating the format of these six
works may be inferred from comments he made in 1966. When an interviewer,
referring specifically to Vir Heroicus Sublimis — which measures eight feet high
and nearly eighteen feet wide — asked Newman about the large size of his works,
the artist explained that he had “never been involved in size for its own sake.”16
He then suddenly recalled that the same year as he made Vir Heroicus Sublimis
14. The works under discussion are Untitled 1, 1950: 36 3
6 in. [BNF 39]; Untitled 2, 1950: 48 3 5-1/8 in. [BNF 40];
Untitled 3, 1950: 56 3 3 in. [BNF 41]; Untitled 4, 1950: 74
3 6 in. [BNF 42]; Untitled 5, 1950: 77 3 3-1/2 in. [BNF 43];
and The Wild (1950): 95-3/8 3 1-5/8 in. [BNF 48]. The title
The Wild was given to the painting much later, in 1962 (see
n. 24 below).
15. The exception is Untitled 4, 1950, whose ratio of
height to width is about 12:1, less than that of the preced-

ing painting. The ratios of the whole sequence of works
are approximately 6:1, 10:1, 19:1, 12:1, 22:1, and 64:1. It is
possible, of course, that Newman worked on two or more
of the paintings simultaneously.
16. Newman, “The Case for ‘Exporting’ Nation’s Avant-
Garde Art,” 271.

Drifting from scale, to a sense of space (the “four horizons” of a “space dome”),
to the instantaneous declaration of space as a felt thing (a feeling that occurs “at
once”), Newman’s characteristically indefinite yet suggestive explanation yields a
set of terms and ideas that sanctions an investigation of the relationships between
them.

Visual and Kinesthetic Stretch in The Wild
Newman claimed that, in painting the vertical works, he passed his self-test for
handling scale. That test seems to have consisted of creating a tangible, domelike
sense of space, using a dimensional format that at first would seem to obviate or
even negate that possibility. A large painting with a sizable surface area tends to
fill the visual field, diminishing the distance conventionally maintained between
a viewer and the artwork, perhaps even facilitating an experience of a spatial
kind. Concerned that viewers would restrain themselves from such an experience
of space during his second one-man show at the Betty Parsons Gallery in 1951,
Newman tacked a note of instructions to the wall, which read simply: “There is a
tendency to look at large pictures from a distance. The large pictures in this exhibition are intended to be seen from a short distance.”17 Newman later explained
that he wanted viewers to feel “full and alive in a spatial dome of 180 degrees
going in all four directions.”18 But compared with a painting like Vir Heroicus
17. Newman, “Statement” (1951), in BN:SWI, 178. The
show took place between April 23 and May 12, 1951, and
included Vir Heroicus Sublimis as well as five, and possibly
all six, of Newman’s narrow canvases.

18. Newman, “ ‘Frontiers of Space,’” 250.
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In 1950, to test myself to see if I were really able to handle the problem
of scale in all its aspects . . . I did the very narrow one-and-a-half-inch
painting [The Wild]. I think it holds up as well as any big one I have ever
done. The issue is one of scale, and scale is a felt thing. . . . The scale of
a painting in the end depends on the artist’s sense of space . . . [and] the
feeling of space involves all four horizons. That is why I have described
my idea of space by calling it the “space dome.” . . . I try to declare the
space so that it is felt at once. (272)

Schreyach

he also had painted The Wild (as well as his other narrow canvases). The central
issue, Newman explained, was not one of size — how large or small something
was — but instead one of scale, that significant quality Newman considered paradoxically independent of physical dimensions yet integrally related to a person’s
sense of space and feelings of place. Size, a matter of measurements, was a problem to be “overcome” (272). The establishment of scale, on the other hand, would
convey to artist and viewer alike the “tangible” sensation of space. As Newman
said of the thin vertical works:
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Sublimis — the expanse of which fills the visual field of those standing close — the
thin vertical stretch of The Wild might initially be judged incommensurate with
such a spatial experience (even if, as Newman thought, it established or achieved
scale).
So extreme did Newman’s exaggeration of the vertical dimension of The
Wild appear that Thomas Hess called the painting “a red line surrounded by
nothing at all.”19 Actually, the painting is a one-inch-t hick, cadmium-red band
bracketed on either side by quarter-inch strips of blue-gray running from top to
bottom. The edges of the central band or stripe are clearly visible at close range,
the result of Newman’s technique of using tape to mask out the linear elements
of his paintings. In making The Wild, the artist first taped the surface along its
length, then painted a grayish slate blue over the masked portion (including over
the tacking margins). After the tape was removed, Newman filled in the band
with red, either freehand or with supplementary tapings over the gray-blue. Frequently, the artist’s multiple applications of paint over or between layers of masking tape leave a slight build-up along tape edges, even after the strips are removed,
and sometimes — as in the case of The Wild — it produces distinct tactile limits
between band and field. Even so, Newman obviously intended to integrate them,
since he applied irregular patches of cadmium over the blue-gray borders along
the length of the zip. The procedure reduces the visual independence of each element, forging instead a sense of interdependence between “band” and “field,” or
“figure” and “ground,” an integrity that is only fortified by the felt compression
of the canvas’s literal narrowness.
The significance of this whole, which for Newman exceeded the achievement of mere formal unity, can be gleaned from a statement he made in 1969
concerning his triangular “shaped works” Jericho (1968–69 [BNF 111]) and Chartres (1969 [BNF 112]). Discussing the meaning of those later works, Newman’s
thought again jumped to the narrow works he had made nearly twenty years
earlier. The issue confronting an artist who chose to work with an oddly shaped
format, he explained, was to “transform the shape into a new kind of totality.”
Could the painting, he asked, “overcome the format and at the same time assert
it? Could it become a work of art and not a thing?”20
How does The Wild simultaneously assert and overcome its format to
become a totality, in Newman’s sense of the term? Assume, for a moment, that
a viewer follows the direction of Newman’s 1951 exhibition note and stands at
a “short distance” from The Wild. As evidence of what Newman thought this
distance should be, consider two well-k nown documentary photographs that can
help us estimate it. The first shows the art critic E. C. Goossen and an unidenti-

19. T. B. H. [Thomas B. Hess], “Newman,” Art News 50,
no. 4 (1951): 47.

20. Newman, “Chartres and Jericho” (1969), in BN:SWI,
194.
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Figure 1. Viewers in front of Vir Heroicus Sublimis at Bennington College, Vermont,
1958. The Barnett Newman Foundation, New York. Photo: Matthias Tarnay

fied woman posing in front of Vir Heroicus Sublimis at Newman’s retrospective
exhibition at Bennington College, Vermont, in 1958 (fig. 1).21 The woman stands
close and looks straight ahead, while Goossen stands even closer to the painting —
my estimate is three or four feet away — and looks at the surface obliquely. Ann
Temkin suggests that Newman responded so positively to what this photograph
suggested about the intimacy between viewers and his paintings that he imitated
the pose for a photograph taken soon after by Peter A. Juley at Newman’s studio.
The image shows Newman and a woman, possibly Dorothy Miller, in front of
Cathedra (1958 [BNF 51]). Both look at the surface obliquely yet this time stand
no more than twelve inches away.22
Consider an adult viewer standing a foot away from The Wild and looking
at it frontally. From this vantage point, the viewer’s eyes would coincide with an
21. Goossen arranged the show. I thank Heidi Colsman-
Freyberger, director of the Barnett Newman Foundation,
for confirming to me Goossen’s identity in the photograph, as well as for permission to reproduce both of the
illustrations used in this essay.

22. See Temkin, “Barnett Newman on Exhibition,” 41.
Bois draws attention to the staged character of the poses,
as well as of those seen in additional photographs by Juley
showing Annalee Newman in her husband’s studio, standing close to The Voice (1950 [BNF 37]) and The Name II
(1950 [BNF 38]) while looking sidelong at their surfaces
(“Newman’s Laterality,” 42–44).
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area just above the center of the painting, between four and five feet up from the
bottom edge of the canvas — adjusting, of course, for the position of the artwork
hanging on the wall, which might vary between, say, eight inches from the gallery floor (as it was hung at Betty Parsons in 1951) and one and a half feet (as it
is currently installed at the Museum of Modern Art in New York). Given such a
position — but allowing for some leeway in curatorial practices, as well as some
variation in the height of individuals — it is this midlevel zone that will attract
the viewer’s scrutiny. However, if a viewer wants to limit her focus to that area
while inspecting minute variations in surface features (such as the ridges left by
Newman’s tape, or the paint handling along the central band’s edges), she will
be required to resist — almost willfully — the most conspicuous feature of the
canvas: its physical extension both above and below her frontal viewpoint. This
vertical stretch competes for the viewer’s attention, diminishing concentrated
foveal vision (the aspect of our vision that, centered on the densest area of retinal
cones within our eyes, is particularly suited for discerning fine details up close)
and concomitantly heightening the work of peripheral vision (suited to organizing the broad spatial scene in front of us).
We usually associate peripheral vision with the horizontal dimension, right
and left, but peripheral is a term that also properly applies to the zones above and
below our central focus, zones in which our foveal perception of fine detail yields
to the apprehension of coarser information about phenomena, such as movement or changes in brightness.23 With regard to The Wild, it is as if the painting calls for a mode of viewing that holds the tendencies of each aspect of our
vision, the foveal and the peripheral (though they cannot strictly be separated),
in equilibrium. This effect is one result of its mode of pictorial address. Viewers
are induced to look closely at the painting, straight on, as well as encouraged to
perceive its extension above and below their eyes. Once this delicate balance is
achieved, however, an interesting perceptual consequence presents itself. The
viewer will become aware that, from his vantage point, he can perceive neither
the upper nor lower edge of the canvas, even if he rolls his eyes upward or downward. Those edges cannot be seen without stepping back or else changing one’s
head position by arching the neck to look at the top of the canvas or bending it
to look down — movements that would, of course, disrupt the equilibrium estab-

23. Our habitual association of peripheral vision with the
horizontal field, as Merleau-Ponty suggests, is the result
of the functionality of that field with respect to our motor
tasks. Simply, our bodily directionality extends more
acutely outward and laterally to our physical situation,
rather than upward (see Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Colin Smith [1945; repr.
London: Routledge, 1962], 303–4, esp. n. 1). The “visual
field” describes that aspect of the visual world that we see
in a limited angle out from the left and right (about 180

degrees), and in a more limited angle upward and downward (about 150 degrees). The boundaries between what
we see clearly and what we see vaguely within this oval
visual cone are not sharply defined, but it possesses a central to peripheral gradient of clarity (see James J. Gibson,
“The Visual Field and the Visual World,” in The Perception of the Visual World [Cambridge, MA: Riverside Press,
1950], 29).

Newman’s own statements pertain to part of what I have been trying to
describe as the perceptual effect of The Wild, but they do not match exactly. My
contention is that The Wild does not generate a mode of spatial experience that is
characterized by encompassment or enclosure in 180 degrees (a “space d
 ome”).
Rather, the painting produces a longitudinal visual stretch that creates a concentrated feeling of space as it extends vertically upward and vaults over the viewer.
In addition, this visual stretch has its kinesthetic correlate in an intensified sense
24. My description of The Wild includes the claim that
the painting seems to hold two aspects of our vision — the
foveal and the peripheral — in equilibrium. There is
another piece of evidence that lends itself in tangential
support of this claim: the title of the painting. Shiff has
incisively pointed out that The Wild may derive as a title
from Newman’s association of wildness with the freedom
of birds. Shiff’s research reveals that in Thomas Hess’s
typescript interview notes for his book Barnett Newman
(1969), he records that Newman was “drawn to ornithology by the ‘wildness of birds’ — the idea of freedom”
(Thomas Hess Papers, Archives of American Art, 1968
[quoted by Richard Shiff, “To Create Oneself,” 106n58]).
If so, then it is interesting to consider the role played by
peripheral and foveal vision in bird-watching, an activity
to which Newman was famously drawn. Birds are often
glimpsed in flight, which is to say they are caught peripherally in the watcher’s glance. The peripheral aspect of
vision is best suited to draw one’s attention to coarser
information about the bird, leading the watcher to make
increasingly finer discriminations concerning the bird’s
wing shape, wingspan, its manner of aerial navigation,
and the like. Such information can be useful for classifi-
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lished between foveal and peripheral vision by totally disrupting the operations
of the former since they are focused on the frontal view.24
The Wild’s extreme visual ascent, combined with its severe narrowness, renders its vertical limits remote, so much so that they are neutralized or made to
stop counting in the beholder’s visual experience. In extending the painting so
far upward, and doing so between two edges so close together, Newman gives
the onlooker access to an accelerated sense of their convergence as they rise, as
if to reestablish the vanishing point over the viewer’s head as the framing edges’
implied destination.25 The sensation of this reorientation of perspective partly
accounts for the impression that, at its upper range, the painting curves over the
head of the viewer, as if peeling away from the wall to form an arc that is sensed,
however indeterminately, to continue up above the viewer’s visual range before
vaulting over him or her to posterior space. (Significantly, this arc is not mirrored
by a corresponding one in the lower range, which is to say that the groundedness
of the body holding its vantage point in front of the canvas is not undercut by a
curve that would sweep under the viewer’s standpoint.)26

cation, and it supplements those aspects of bird-watching
that depend upon more detailed viewing, such as studying the bird’s shape, color, bodily structure, manners of
nesting, feeding, and preening. In addition, then, to the
connotative associations of The Wild with Newman’s personal interest in the “vertical” freedom of birds, there is
a phenomenological correspondence between the mode
of pictorial address experienced in viewing The Wild and
the modes of visual perception that are brought to bear in
bird-watching.
25. I thank Charles Palermo for helping me to formulate
these points.
26. Bois notes, apropos of Onement I, that Newman’s vertical zips, especially as they are seen to mirror the symmetry of the standing human figure, imply a “nonreversibility of top and bottom” (“Perceiving Newman,” 196), and
he quotes Newman on the point: “All my paintings have
a top and a bottom” (198; original citation in Newman,
“ ‘Frontiers of Space,’” 249).
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of the body’s upright posture. The progression of the sequence of narrow canvases to dimensions of increasing disparity between width and height can thus be
understood to narrate a progression of both visual sensation and a certain kind of
bodily feeling. As a viewer’s vision is increasingly stretched, so too are intensified
the kinesthetic sensations associated with posture — with the skeletal and muscular structure of the human body that serves to hold it upright. Understanding
how both aspects, visual and kinesthetic, function in The Wild sets a foundation
for determining how Vir Heroicus Sublimis conveys a feeling of space (and, indeed,
for interpreting the values associated with it).27
Thus, the verticality of The Wild performs two important functions. First,
it demands a beholder’s recognition that the pictorial field — the conventional
conceptualization of which depends on the suggestion of an upright plane parallel
to the viewer’s body and extending laterally — can also be instantiated as a matter of an upright plane extending vertically into the space above and below the
customary focal point of foveal vision, a longitudinal pictorial field that thus can
be understood to exist in relation to the midline, or mesial, plane of the body.
Second, the extreme verticality of The Wild, combined with its attenuated lateral
dimension, makes obsolete any consideration of a pictorial space that is oriented
to the viewer as a horizontal expanse and accessible to penetrating view.28 Judging from The Wild, Newman — in his quest to rid painting of the “props and
crutches” of the Western pictorial tradition — was looking for a way to make a
painting that resisted the viewer’s unchecked projection into an imaginary space
or fictive world (which is tantamount to saying that he wanted to give the paint-

27. My claims for the “verticality” of The Wild have little in common with Rosalind Krauss’s theorization of the
term. Krauss equates verticality with sublimation and
criticizes Clement Greenberg’s putative sublimation of
Jackson Pollock, arguing against the tendency to see Pollock’s work as fulfilling a retrospectively conceptualized
trajectory from the disordered and wild (the horizontal)
to the ordered and transcendent (the vertical). See Krauss,
The Optical Unconscious (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1993), 242–320. Other scholars who have focused on verticality in ways different from mine include Matthew Rohn
and Claude Cernuschi. In his Visual Dynamics in Jackson Pollock’s Abstractions (Ann Arbor, MI: UMI Research
Press, 1984), Rohn adopts the approach of gestalt psychology in his account of upright visual fields (an approach, it
bears mentioning, that Krauss singles out for criticism),
arguing that since visual activity “counts differently in the
upper reaches of our gravity-influenced perceptual world
than in the lower realms,” viewers have an “innate potential” to discern “varying dynamics within the visual field
as a whole” (3 – 4). Cernuschi elaborates a somewhat parallel idea in his book “Not an Illustration but the Equivalent”: A Cognitive Approach to Abstract Expressionism (Cran-

bury, NJ: Associated University Presses, 1997), where he
utilizes the concepts of cognitive science to explain how
abstract painting conveys meaning to viewers. Cernuschi argues that the cognitive meaning of abstract paintings can reliably be discerned by attending to the kinds
of physical adjustments and their attendant mental operations that are stimulated by the artwork under view. He
explains: “Meaning emerges from the structure of embodied experience and from the associations spectators attach
to that structure” (89).
28. My analysis here shares something with Fried’s suggestion that in looking at large canvases by Newman
(Fried’s example is Cathedra), “We have the sensation
of entering a medium with a certain specific density, a
medium that offers an almost measurable degree of resistance to eyesight itself.” See Michael Fried, “Three American Painters: Noland, Olitski, Stella” (1965), reprinted in
Fried, Art and Objecthood: Essays and Reviews (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1998), 213–65, at 232. In the
case of The Wild, that “measurable degree of resistance”
is exponentially higher than in Newman’s other works.

the pairing was suggestive — were they complements or opposites? — reviews of
the show (predominantly negative) did not catch on to how Newman’s curatorial choice was meant to guide interpretation of the canvases in relation to each
other. The pairing stands as evidence for the contention that the mode of pictorial address that The Wild fixes for a viewer relates definitively to the visual
and kinesthetic dynamics of Newman’s sense of space, specifically as that space
is created for a viewer by Vir Heroicus Sublimis. Perceptually, The Wild creates
a kind of anamorphosis of the visual field, in the vertical dimension, while it
simultaneously elicits a kinesthetic feeling of stretch: this claim is not just about
brute facts of the painting as a material object. Rather, the claim concerns how
a beholder recognizes or acknowledges the intentional structure of the work in
question. The claim depends for its fittingness upon the reciprocity of artwork
29. The criticism might be made that the account I am
proposing here proceeds from a decontextualized phenomenology — that is, from a general perspective that
does little to facilitate context-oriented, art historical
scholarship. Insofar as the aim of such scholarship is to
reconstruct what Newman’s contemporaries thought were
the meanings of his paintings, or else to track the changing interpretations of those meanings over time and in
different contexts, the endeavor is usually accomplished, if
not always made entirely convincing, by reference to documentary source material or evidence of a textual nature.
In part, I rely on the testimony of the first viewer of the
paintings: Newman. But this kind of evidence is not necessary to verify the points I am making about a viewer’s
perception of The Wild (or any other painting). Once it
is accepted as a painting — that is, as belonging to a set
of artifacts with a history, and responsive to the conventions established in and through that history — the object
of regard frames or, better, is the condition of its being
beheld in a certain way: a way that, moreover, is entirely
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“Fittingness” and “Facingness” in Untitled 2, 1950
When Newman first exhibited The Wild in 1951, it was the only painting installed
on the gallery’s center wall, directly opposite Vir Heroicus Sublimis. Visitors entering the room walked into the middle of a dramatic face-off between the latter painting — a 144-square-foot expanse of brilliant red, punctuated at various
intervals by five top-to-bottom bands — and the thin vertical canvas, with an area
of just 144 square inches, that Ann Temkin has called its “inverse.”30 Although
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ing, as an object, a coherence and integrity that prevented its being merely a
stimulus for a beholder’s subjective projections). He created a mode of pictorial
address that maintained the positions of both painting and viewer as discrete
entities or even subjects facing each other.29

the result of the artist’s intentionally making it one way
and not another. Thus, the relation between Newman’s
intentional mode of pictorial address and the viewers’
perceptual experience is not only, or even primarily, to
be determined by investigating the historical contexts
of those encounters. Instead, that relation — and more
precisely, the meaning of that relation — is discerned, or
potentially discerned, every time a viewer beholds the
work.
30. Temkin, Barnett Newman, 42. Bois discusses this
instance of Newman’s curatorial logic in “1951,” in Hal Foster, Rosalind Krauss, Yve-A lain Bois, and Benjamin H. D.
Buchloh, Art Since 1900: Modernism, Antimodernism, Postmodernism, vol. 2 (New York: Thames and Hudson, 2004),
362–67.
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and viewer.31 It is not that the painting merely determines or causes the beholder
to experience it in a certain way, but rather that its mode of address allows for the
possibility that the viewer will honor that address with a proper response. Since
the character of this relationship is the condition for Newman’s alternative modes
of pictorial address, it may be helpful to consider one of those alternatives.
Untitled 2, 1950 (fig. 2) is scaled quite differently than The Wild. It, too, was
shown at Betty Parsons in 1951. Measuring four feet high by just over five inches
wide, the painting consists of an impenetrable matte black band, about one-third
the width of the whole, which runs parallel to the entire length of the right edge.
A visibly brushed veil of tomato-soup red fills the other two-thirds of the painting’s surface area. An integral part of the work is the simple wooden frame, constructed by Jackson Pollock, that surrounds it. At an eye-catching three inches
deep, the frame gives the painting a boxlike aspect and calls attention to the
relationship between the surface image, on the one hand, and the object’s physical construction, on the other. How do these two aspects of the work — painting
as image, painting as object — contribute to its meaning? Untitled 2, 1950 fits the
frame made especially for it and faces the viewer.
Consider the possibility, first, that Newman accentuated the physical depth
of Untitled 2, 1950 in order to draw attention to its relatively exaggerated projection out from the wall, a projection that diminishes the distance traditionally
maintained between a viewer and a painting. Second, consider that he may have
done so to prevent a viewer from taking the content of the work to be identical
to the visual perception of the image alone. Put differently, Newman instinctively avoided reducing pictorial content to the virtual coincidence of the image
and the flatness of its supporting canvas. Instead, Untitled 2, 1950 generates its
content by means of its “fittingness.” The painting fits into its frame in a manner
that utterly suspends our seeing the frame as a decorative border that brackets a
view; it rather seems to support — or perhaps to hold — the image within it. The

31. My use of the term reciprocity has an affinity with that
of Paul Crowther, whose approach to Newman other
wise contrasts with my own. (Crowther published his
account of Newman twice: first in 1984 [“Barnett Newman and the Sublime,” Oxford Art Journal 7, no. 2 (1984):
52 – 59] and then, in revised form, thirteen years later
[in The Language of Twentieth-Century Art: A Conceptual
History (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997),
149 – 63]). Crowther clarifies philosophically the distinct versions of the sublime offered by Edmund Burke
and Immanuel Kant, showing how their respective versions compared with Newman’s ideas about sublimity.
In his revised version, Crowther situates his account of
Newman in a larger argument about iterability — that
is, about a sign’s capacity to be recognized as a sign independent of any particular context. That recognition,

originating in the basic reciprocity between body and
world, plays a key role, according to Crowther, in “organizing human consciousness” (9). The aesthetic object
reveals this principle of reciprocity to be the fundamental condition of human cognition, intelligibility, and
(self-)reflection. Crowther’s approach to Newman’s art
depends on theory first, often ignoring the perceptual
effects of individual paintings. To understand Vir Heroicus
Sublimis, for instance, Crowther says we need “a thoroughgoing knowledge of Newman’s theoretical propositions. . . .
[The painting] depends on a matrix of aesthetic theory
in order to be read authentically” (158). I disagree with
this assertion.
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Figure 2. Barnett
Newman, Untitled 2,
1950, 1950. Oil on
canvas, 121.9 x 13
cm (48 x 5-1/8 in.).
The Menil Collection,
Houston. Photo:
Adam Baker

mutual reinforcement, or the intrinsic complementarity, of image and support is
palpable in this fitting. With it, Newman decisively challenges the convention of
framing a spectacular view, whether illusionistic or abstract. That is to say: the
painting, because its surface is faced to the viewer within a frame that reinforces
the integrity or cohesion of the whole, delivers a sense of being fit both to itself
and for a viewer.32
Untitled 2, 1950 consolidates artwork and subject. By combining image and
support into a manifestly coherent whole, the painting simultaneously allows
32. It might be useful to consider Newman’s emphasis on flatness — at least, as far as Untitled 2, 1950 is concerned — as driven more by his desire to create the effect
of “facingness” than by the modernist concern, expressed
most rigorously during Newman’s lifetime by Clement
Greenberg, in the self-reflexive investigation of the medium’s specificity (particularly as it coincides with the flat-

ness of the painting surface). Both for the origin of this
point and for an explanation of how it relates to “frontality” in the work of Miró, see Charles Palermo, Fixed
Ecstasy: Joan Miró in the 1920s (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2008), 244n6.
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a viewer to recognize his autonomy (he discovers his own fit as mirrored or
matched by the fittingness of the painting before him) and to fortify his position as a subject who may choose to acknowledge it.33 This mode of pictorial
address depends for its value (or in Newman’s terminology, its scale) on the extent
to which the viewer finds himself — indeed, discovers himself to be — facing an
other. Additionally, it is important to observe that this consolidation has a kinesthetic correlate. If in perceiving The Wild, by far the most proportionally extreme
of the narrow paintings, a viewer feels a vertical stretch or elongation, then in
confronting Untitled 2, 1950 she may feel a converse feeling: one of bodily cohesion or containment, of shortening or tightening of the posture, of bodily “fit.”
(The connotations of the term as it relates to personal attire are apt.)

The Dynamics of Spatial Experience in Vir Heroicus Sublimis
At the 1951 Parsons show, “the materially defiant narrowness” of The Wild (as
Richard Shiff has called it) faced the visually absorbing lateral expanse of Vir
Heroicus Sublimis.34 Since that time, the emphasis in accounts of the latter painting has been on its embracing scale and color. Allan Kaprow wrote of it in 1963
that “the vast sea of intense red . . . fills the space in front of the canvas, surrounding the viewer, almost ‘dyeing’ him with the relentless hue.”35 Lawrence
Alloway in 1969 called that experience an “ ‘advancing space’ effect, a kind of
expansion of the painting’s threshold into the area occupied by the spectator . . .
[who] become[s] implicated in the irradiating surface.”36 Newman’s close friend,
the artist Robert Murray, may have had Vir Heroicus Sublimis in mind as he
remarked that “when you stand close to one of Newman’s paintings you become
enveloped in the whole aura of color, and it becomes a wonderfully sensory kind
of experience.”37
As these descriptions, with their emphasis on being surrounded or enveloped, suggest, viewers of Vir Heroicus Sublimis become involved in its color (the
33. My understanding of acknowledgment derives
broadly from the work of Stanley Cavell but is even more
indebted to Michael Fischer’s explication of Cavell’s
thought in Stanley Cavell and Literary Skepticism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989). There, Fischer
examines the “other minds skeptic” (for example, a person
who questions whether we can really know if other people
are in pain) as one who lapses into a “disturbing human
possibility, or temptation” to doubt the capacity of others to express themselves (61). That avoidance is a kind
of violence against acknowledgment, which he and Cavell
describe as the positive moment of accepting that it is our
responsibility to make decisions regarding our knowledge of others and our relationships with them. Although
these decisions are always made on a contingent basis,
they nonetheless proclaim generally our attunement with

others. I have also learned a great deal from Aron Vinegar’s discussion “Of Ducks, Decorated Sheds, and Other
Minds,” in I Am a Monument: On Learning from Las Vegas
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2008), 49–92. See also the
essays “Knowing and Acknowledging” and “The Avoidance of Love” in Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say?
(New York: Charles Scribner, 1969), 238–353.
34. Shiff, “To Create Oneself,” 86.
35. Allan Kaprow, “Impurity,” Art News 61, no. 9 (1963):
30–33, 52–55.
36. Lawrence Alloway, “Notes on Barnett Newman,” Art
International 13, no. 6 (1969): 35–39, at 38.
37. Robert Murray, “Remembering Newman,” in Ho,
Reconsidering Barnett Newman, 16.

367
B a r n e t t N e w m a n ’s “ S e n s e o f S p a c e ”
•

Schreyach

stress is on the word’s etymological meaning: to be enfolded). A halation of red
seems to permeate and fill the “empty” space in front of the surface. (Newman
explained, “My canvases are full not because they are full of colors but because
color makes the fullness”).38 Yet, as Donald Judd perceptively pointed out, this
fullness does not cause the color to appear to extend beyond the left and right
edges of the canvas, an effect that would imply a continuum that spreads laterally.39 Rather, the viewer’s chromatic experience is secured by five top-to-bottom
stripes, ranging in width from about one to three inches and placed at irregular
intervals across the surface. A few feet from the left edge is a stripe of red that is
of a lighter tone than the rest of the surface; followed by a stripe of crisp white;
then a thicker one of dark brown; another of light red; and finally, along the right
edge, a darkened yellow. The bands structure what might otherwise dissolve into
the impression of an amorphous red expanse.
The vertical length of the bands measures Newman’s colored field in height,
and their lateral placement helps demarcate its breadth. What would be the effect
of their absence? Without the zips, the broad area of the field would overwhelm
any sense of its being modulated or differentiated, resulting in an overall homogeneity. Staring into a painting with attenuated visual relief, a viewer would perceive a nonoriented space, and the painting might induce a sense of placelessness.
Yet Newman avoided precisely this effect by carefully arranging the bands so
that viewers, when standing at a short distance from the surface and looking at it
either frontally or obliquely, will — to greater or lesser degrees — perceive one or
more of the zips in their field of vision.40 The possibilities of what can or cannot
be perceived play out differently across the canvas surface, depending on where
the viewer stands and on the angle of her vision relative to the picture plane. But
in all cases, as Yve-A lain Bois has pointed out, the bands constantly “solicit” our
gaze, securing our sense of a perceptual experience that, however open to fullness
it may be, nonetheless has structure.41
38. Newman, “ ‘Frontiers of Space,’” 249.
39. For Judd’s precise description, see “Barnett Newman”
(1970), in Donald Judd: Complete Writings, 1959–75 (New
York: New York University Press, 1975), 200–2.
40. For instance, if a viewer positions herself closely to
the painting between the first and second zips from the
left edge and then looks obliquely toward the right edge
of the canvas, she will firmly perceive those two zips (one
a lighter tone of red, the other a brilliant white), as well as
a third zip (the strip of maroon brown), but will be unable,
without moving her head position dramatically, to perceive the limit of the canvas (that is, its literal right edge).
E. C. Goossen made an observation not dissimilar to my
own concerning the effect of indeterminate space and
its control by the bands: they “catch the eye just enough
to allow the expanse of vermilion to sink in (in the Air

Force, pilots are trained never to look at anything directly,
particularly at light, in order to see it more fully).” See
Goossen, “The Philosophic Line of B. Newman,” Art
News (1958), reprinted in David and Cecile Shapiro, eds.,
Abstract Expressionism: A Critical Record (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 332–35, at 334.
41. Bois, “Perceiving Newman,” 203 (with regard to Concord) and 212 (with regard to Vir Heroicus Sublimis). Bois
makes the point that the “singularity” of the modulations
performed by the zips is ultimately “denied by the lateral
spread of our perception,” preventing us from fixing them
securely as a figure against a ground (212). Peter de Bolla
offers an admirable description of his affective response
to Vir Heroicus Sublimis, by keying it to the “modes and
modalities of reception and understanding” he thinks
Newman intended to convey. Central to his account is
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Bois argues that the content of Newman’s paintings derives from the way
they address a fundamental condition of embodied perception, a condition that
he takes to be marked by an essential ambiguity. To Bois, Newman’s artistic
production is a “radical attack against any kind of assurance that we might falsely
attribute to our perception.”42 For instance, in Abraham (1949 [BNF 23]) the “subdued lateral displacement” of the darker band weakens the power of the exact
symmetrical division of the canvas by the band’s right edge. The discrepancy
between what we see and what we can measure and know creates a perceptual
uncertainty that is matched by another one: the indeterminacy between figure
and ground. The relatively close values of the midnight blue-black band and the
deep green-black field impede a viewer’s confident assertion that one is figure
and the other is ground. Instead, there is an oscillation between those categories.
Since neither figure nor ground is given to us absolutely, we must, according to Bois, “preconsciously construct [what each is] differently each time we are
solicited to perceive.”43 This is a strategy to “emphasize the intentional nature
of the perceptual field by urging us to shift from our preconscious perceptual
activity . . . to a conscious one, and at the same time to prevent this consciousness
from crystallizing in any definite way.” In the case of Vir Heroicus Sublimis, Bois
likewise argues that we are “constantly in the process of adjusting and readjusting
the fundamental figure/ground opposition” because its zips continually solicit our
attention as we scan the canvas. This indeterminacy is compounded by the sheer
fluctuation of its chromatic expanse, which “renounce[s] the possibility of [our]
ever controlling [the painting] perceptually.” Bois proposes that “the only factual
certitude that we [can] grasp [is] the lateral expanse of the canvas, the pictorial
field as such.”44
In accounting for the dynamics of spatial experience in Vir Heroicus Sublimis, I take my cue from Bois’s emphasis on the bluntly factual nature of a lateral
expanse that demands our attention but is punctuated (or perhaps held together)
by zips that simultaneously solicit our gaze. However, I am unconvinced of the
endless fluctuation of figure and ground — and the indeterminacy at the heart of
our perceptual experience — that this oscillation supposedly inaugurates. In my
view, the spread of vision across the horizontal expanse of the canvas is checked
by the vertical zips, just as the stretch of a singular zip is parried, but not canceled,
by the magnetic draw of the painting’s laterality.

the idea that the painting encourages our apprehension
of “a sense of community, of belonging to a shared space,
inhabiting a communal experience.” See his “Serenity:
Barnett Newman’s Vir Heroicus Sublimis,” in Art Matters
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), 23–55,
38–39.
42. Bois, “Perceiving Newman,” 199.

43. Quotations from Bois here and in the remainder of
this paragraph are from “Perceiving Newman,” 203–4.
44. In a subsequent essay, Bois argues that this laterality
“forc[es] the beholder to appeal to his or her peripheral
vision” and thus “catches us in the process of perceiving.”
See “Newman’s Laterality,” 34 and 36, where Bois writes
specifically about Abraham but implies that the point
applies to many of Newman’s works.

45. Newman, “ ‘Frontiers of Space,’” 250.
46. Gerard Jan van Bladeren knifed Newman’s painting
at the Stedelijk Museum in Amsterdam in April 1986. He
returned in November 1997 and repeated his attack, this
time on Cathedra. These are not isolated instances. Ann
Temkin notes that Newman’s work “bears the grim distinction of being perhaps the most often vandalized in
the history of art, not for political or other purposes but
purely on the basis of what it is, or is not” (Barnett New-
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A triple movement of perception governs this mutual dynamic. I would
divide, though for explanatory purposes only, the perception of Vir Heroicus Sublimis into three stages (even if they are interdependent and occur simultaneously).
First, Newman radically challenges a viewer to maintain his sense of bodily position and optical viewpoint when beholding the painting. The sense of being surrounded by color, absorbed by it, or subsumed into it by the painting’s sheer
physical size and chromatic extent, is difficult for the viewer to resist. One might
be tempted to drift into a reverie or to lose oneself in the potentially amorphous
effects of color alone. Yet a second stage intervenes in this process. A conscientious viewer will be struck by how the zips attract him, restoring to him — against
the lateral dissolution of his gaze and against his corresponding kinesthetic feeling of corporeal dispersion — a momentary sense of psychic and bodily integrity
that constitutes him as an independent entity, separate from the painting yet in
dialogue with it. (This effect is the same as the one I have described in relation
to the way that Untitled 2, 1950 consolidates the subject as fit to face the artwork.
The equilibrium relates to Newman’s sense of scale: recall that scale can also
designate a device that balances two disparate objects.) Third and finally, when
the viewer attends to or fixes on one of the five bands in his visual field, he experiences the visual and kinesthetic stretch that I described with regard to The Wild:
a verticality that the viewer may experience as feeling placed, “full and alive in a
spatial dome of 180 degrees going in all four directions.”45
This last is the moment (“felt at once”) when a viewer rightly experiences
Vir Heroicus Sublimis — when, feeling a dome of space declare itself around her,
she apprehends a “sensation of complete space.” This resulting sense of place,
sense of space, is achieved in the midst of a struggle between the viewer’s temptation to lose herself in the colored field and the painting’s palpable resistance to
letting her do so unimpeded. The struggle is for the ontological primacy of art’s
scale over its literal material. The failure into which beholders might lapse, indeed
have lapsed, is refusing to acknowledge its mode of pictorial address, attempting
to defeat the painting, and even, in the extreme case, attacking the canvas. In
1986, a man slashed Who’s Afraid of Red, Yellow, and Blue III with a knife.46

man, 16). For the connection between violence and the
refusal or avoidance of acknowledgment, see “Othello
and the Stake of the Other,” in Stanley Cavell, Disowning
Knowledge in Six Plays by Shakespeare (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 125–42. I thank Aron Vinegar for discussing this point with me.
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The Affective Mode of Pictorial Address
What are the implications of Newman’s mode of pictorial address, and of how
it has been interpreted? In Bois’s analyses of Newman, there are three themes
concerning the relationship of viewer to artwork that govern his interpretation
of particular paintings. All three may be operative at any one time, but, as I hope
to show, one holds sway over the others. The first might be called the theme of
exchange, in which the viewer faces the painting as if it were another entity or
subject to be engaged with reciprocally. Take Bois’s interpretation of Onement I
(1948 [BNF 14]). Bois understands the painting to be “an attempt to address the
spectator directly, immediately, as an ‘I’ to a ‘You,’ and not with the distance of
the third person that is characteristic of fiction.”47 The relationship of viewer to
painting seems at first to be one of conversational equals, even if it is curiously
lacking in intimacy (not “we” to “each other,” but “I” to “You”). It may be worth
pondering what motivates Bois’s insistence on this moment of direct address.
As I read Bois, the intensity of the dialogic relationship implied by this scenario
underwrites a desire for a bonding between the subject and the other, as if the
sheer existence of the painting as a separate entity creates an unbearable gap that
only “direct address” will bridge.48 Thus, it may not be surprising that overcoming this distance is Bois’s second theme. Newman’s canvases overwhelm the subject position that a viewer would otherwise maintain. The irresistible appeal of
Newman’s color facilitates this compulsory union. When we look at Anna’s Light
(1968 [BNF 107]), Bois claims, “we cannot even attempt to focus on anything but
are constantly obliged to deal with the mere vastness of the whole red field, as a
whole chunk of color.”49 Even the slight modulations in the color of Anna’s Light
“function as a sort of internal respiration of the field of color that has become as
indivisible as one’s own body” — phrasing that seems to suggest a psychophysiological continuum binding viewer to painting.50
The third theme is somewhat like the inverse of the second. Instead of
exchange or union, opposition and confrontation characterize the relationship
of viewer and painting. Bois’s phenomenological analysis of Newman’s work is
forceful; I understand his account, indeed, to harbor certain extreme implications. One of Bois’s concerns is the degree to which the beholder, in succumbing
to the lateral spread of his or her perception (unwillfully, it seems, since he or she
is “forc[ed]” to do so), is unable to maintain not only his or her physical feeling

47. Bois, “Perceiving Newman,” 193.
48. My point here parallels one made by Michael Fischer
concerning the general tendency of deconstructionist
critics to adopt a skeptical position with regard to the
validity of knowing any literary text. In Fischer’s view (following Cavell), the skeptic, dissatisfied with ordinary ways
of knowing, is motivated to establish a more rigorous con-

nection to objects in immediate consciousness. But since
this connection is not established within the ordinary
forms of life in which it can be secured, it fails to hold,
and the skeptical quest for certainty ends in doubt. See
Fischer, Stanley Cavell and Literary Skepticism, esp. 31–32.
49. Bois, “Perceiving Newman,” 212.
50. Bois, “Perceiving Newman,” 213.
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of being positioned before the painting (the viewer’s literal placement) but also
his or her sense of personal integrity, or well-being, in facing the artwork. Even
though Bois explicitly sympathizes with Newman’s intent to establish for his
viewers a sense of place, a “Here I am” that is an “affirmation of existence,” there
is a lurking severity to the encounter of painting and viewer.51 Concerning Anna’s
Light, Bois writes: “The colored field seems to move with us, to follow our gaze as
a dog follows his master or the shadow our walking body. . . . [I]t ‘moves’ without
ever leaving its base, reaffirming its instantaneous blast each time we try to distance ourselves from it.”52 A viewer, apparently, cannot help but surrender to the
affective power of this chromatic stalker (even if, as its “master,” one is entitled
to enslave it). Instead of facing the painting on terms of reciprocity, Bois has us
pacing back and forth in front of it, haunted by an anonymous and vaguely threatening presence. The mutually beneficial exchange characteristic of acknowledgment yields to a situation distinguished by danger and confrontation. Looking at
a painting such as Vir Heroicus Sublimis, we are, according to Bois, “solicited by
the vibrating ocean of violent color, never able to survey the whole and yet forced
to acknowledge its existence[;] we experience it as ‘here — not there,’ full in our
face.”53 We will feel present, it seems, even when — perhaps especially when — we
get punched.
In my view, the implication in Bois’s account of violent confrontation
between viewer and painting negates the spirit of Newman’s enterprise (although
I make this criticism in full acknowledgment of Bois’s obvious respect for Newman’s art and life). Arguably, the best paintings by Newman ask their viewers
to understand their implications in terms of mutual relationships: “I think you
can only feel others,” he said, “if you have some sense of your own being.”54 His
paintings make a viewer aware of her specific individual self, as distinguished
from her constructed identity, or her personality type as culturally assigned.
Recognition of self is the first step in understanding mutual relationships. Bois
does recognize the beneficial result of experiencing Newman’s sense of space
and place, not to mention his sense of scale: one feels the security of being where
one is and faces the ethical dimension of relationships. But, at the same time,
Bois conjures an affective aggression induced by Newman’s canvases. Vir Heroicus
Sublimis “force[s] [us] to relinquish our mastery over the visual field.”55 Looking
at Who’s Afraid of Red, Yellow, and Blue III (1967–68 [BNF 106]), Bois reiterates his
metaphor of fisticuffs: “The engulfing red is overwhelming: one cannot dodge its
blow.”56 Newman’s large paintings make us submit, after we have fought for our
lives. The model of viewer on offer here does not seem to be the same as the one
51. Bois, “Newman’s Laterality,” 42.
52. Bois, “Perceiving Newman,” 212.
53. Bois, “1951,” 362–67, at 365.

54. Newman, “Interview with David Sylvester” (1965),
257–58.
55. Bois, “1951,” 365.
56. Bois, “1951,” 366.
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imagined by Newman when he associated the impact of his paintings with meeting another person: “There’s a metaphysical thing in the fact that people meet
and see each other, and if a meeting of people is meaningful it affects both their
lives,” he told David Sylvester in 1965.57 Instead, the model of a viewer implied
in Bois’s account is that of a vandal being provoked to attack: “Presumably,” Bois
writes, “the man who knifed [Who’s Afraid . . . III], furiously slashing it three
times across, could not bear the heat.”58 On this account, instead of Newman’s
metaphysics of relationship, we have trauma.

Newman’s Mode of Pictorial Address
What are the implications of Newman’s sense of space for understanding how his
paintings establish “human scale,” the aspect of painting that mattered most to
him? Understanding scale is not merely a matter of defining the term; scale is a
quality that must be experienced to be interpreted. I have used the phrase “mode
of pictorial address” here primarily to designate this aspect of the painting-viewer
relationship. Newman’s mode of pictorial address is a complex exchange that
is inaugurated by his creation of a painting and is consummated by a viewer’s
acknowledgment of it (and thus also of the artist’s intentions). Newman said as
much when, in 1957, he criticized Frank Getlein, who had disparaged Vir Heroicus
Sublimis in the pages of the New Republic.59 Newman wrote a letter to the editor
in which he stated that his paintings “embody a vision and a way of looking that
never existed before.”60 Both sides are necessary for a mode of pictorial address:
the paintings have or embody a vision (that of the painter) and also a way of looking (which is the responsibility of the viewer).
When he embarked on the vertical works in 1950, Newman had just completed what was and would remain his most productive year of work; he had
completed eighteen paintings. That productivity, many scholars have suggested,
was partly a consequence of his creation of Onement I. “What it made me realize,” Newman said of that painting in 1965, “is that I was confronted for the first
time with the thing that I did, whereas up until that moment I was able to remove
myself from the act of painting, or from the painting itself. [Before], the painting
was something that I was making, whereas somehow for the first time with this
painting the painting itself had a life of its own.”61 Regarding the light cadmium
57. Newman, “Interview with David Sylvester,” 259.
58. Bois, “1951,” 366. Newman told an anecdote about
another viewer who could not stand the heat: “I remember
an incident during my first show, in 1950, where a friend
of mine, a painter, got terribly upset and had tears in his
eyes and began to abuse me. And I said: ‘What’s the trouble?’ He said: ‘You called me names, you made me aware
of myself.’ I said: ‘Well, take it easy. I mean, everything is

going to be alright.’” See Newman, “Interview with David
Sylvester,” 258.
59. Frank Getlein, “Review of American Paintings,
1945–47” (1957), included in BN:SWI, 209–10.
60. Newman, “Letter to the Editor, New Republic” (1957),
in BN:SWI, 211.
61. Newman, “Interview with David Sylvester,” 256.
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red band that he painted along its central axis, he said: “I realized that I had filled
the surface. . . . I felt that for the first time for myself there was no picture making.
That stroke made the thing come to life for me.”62
Why was avoiding or canceling “picture making” so important to Newman? Recall that, when asked about his motivations for making such oddly proportioned works as Untitled 2, 1950 and The Wild, Newman answered that he
was testing himself, trying to establish a human scale. But for him, scale was “a
felt thing,” rather than “something that you can build up or develop by relating
parts.”63 “Picture making” referred to those traditional compositional strategies
of relating parts. Because his paintings were not composed of meshed parts, of
shapes pushing and pulling against each other to establish either a sense of dynamism or one of equilibrium, Newman thought that his works transcended the
closed systems of aesthetic compositional rules found in conventional painting
and thus achieved totality: “I was constantly concerned in doing a painting that
would move in its totality as you see it. You look at it and you see it. . . . Otherwise,
a painter is a kind of choreographer of space, and he creates a kind of dance of
elements, and it becomes a narrative art instead of a visual art.”64
Discussing the work of Kenneth Noland and Anthony Caro in 1965,
Michael Fried expressed in his own terms what I take to be the ultimate significance of Newman’s circumvention of composing or choreography. When we
compose, Fried suggests,
we step back, see how it looks, worry about its appearance — above all
we put it at arm’s length: this is what composing, seeing it in compositional terms, means. We distance it. And our inclination to do this
amounts in effect to a desire to escape the work, to break its grip on
us, to destroy the intimacy it threatens to create, to pull out. And one
doesn’t step back or pull out just a little, or more or less. (The relevant
comparison is with human relationships here.) One is either in or out:
and if one steps back, whatever the grip of the thing was or may have
been is broken or forestalled, and whatever the relationship was or may
have been is ended or aborted. There is even a sense in which it is only
then that one begins to see: that one becomes a spectator. But of course
the object (or person) now being seen for the first time is no longer the
same.65

62. Newman, “Interview with Emile de Antonio,” 306.
63. Newman, “ ‘The Case for ‘Exporting’ Nation’s Avant-
Garde Art,” 272.
64. Newman, “Interview with Emile de Antonio,” 306.
65. Michael Fried, “Anthony Caro and Kenneth Noland:
Some Notes on Not Composing,” Lugano Review 1 (1965):
206 (the essay is not reprinted in Fried’s book of selected

art criticism, but the paragraph cited appears in an endnote to “An Introduction to My Art Criticism,” in Art and
Objecthood, 64n46). Fried’s account of Newman’s painting
has been important for my own thinking, in particular
because he subtly considers the values at stake in Newman’s handling of formal problems.
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When you see a person for the first time, you have an immediate impact.
You don’t really have to start looking at details. It’s a total reaction in
which the entire personality of a person and your own personality make
contact. . . . If you have to stand there examining the eyelashes and all
that sort of thing, it becomes a cosmetic situation in which you remove
yourself from the experience.66

Examining eyelashes is like seeing things in compositional terms: the result is
cosmetic, a worry about appearances, a mask over the real thing that distances
you from the subject (not object) of your regard. On Newman’s terms, a painting “move[s] in its totality” when it entails relationships analogous to those of
intimacy that (sometimes) obtain between individuals. Although a painting like
Onement I is not literally another individual, its totality both solicits a viewer’s
attention (as another person might), while also maintaining its separateness as an
integral object that is closed to us. The simultaneity of openness and closedness
is the condition for any process of self-discovery or self-creation that is grounded
in reciprocity. Scale is this balance between self and other.67
To highlight the stakes of this analysis, consider two competing, if not antithetical, positions about how to view Newman’s work. The first is provided by
the art critic Peter Schjeldahl, who, in a discussion of Vir Heroicus Sublimis, suggested that the bodily “poise” of the artist’s zips “invades and displaces our sense
of ourselves, and the effect is a brief but intense experience that begs to be called
the sublime: loss of selfhood to something bigger and nobler than we are.”68
(This account is exactly opposite to the one I have labored to produce, in which
the bands establish the integrity and cohesion of the body despite the lateral
dispersion of the gaze.) The second position is offered by the artist Mel Bochner,
who on seeing a viewer bathed in a red glow in front of Vir Heroicus Sublimis,
recounted: “I realized [that the color on the viewer] was the light shining on the
painting reflecting back, filling the space between the viewer and the artwork
that created the space, the place. And [I realized] that that reflection of the self
of the painting, the painting as the subject reflected on the viewer, was a wholly
new category of experience.”69 Because Schjeldahl allows himself to identify so
66. Newman, “Interview with Emile de Antonio,” 306.
67. Newman, “Interview with Emile de Antonio,” 306.
I thank Todd Cronan for conversations that helped me
understand more fully the implications of my analysis for
the interpretation of Newman’s mode of pictorial address
in this and the next section. See also Cronan, Against
Affective Formalism: Matisse, Bergson, Modernism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, forthcoming).

68. Peter Schjeldahl, “Lord Barney: Barnett Newman’s
Majestic Abstractions,” New Yorker, April 15, 2002, www
.newyorker.com/archive/2002/04/15/020415craw_artworld.
69. Mel Bochner, discussion session, symposium on Barnett Newman, Harvard University, May 15, 1992, audiotape, Harvard University Art Museums, as quoted in
Shiff, “To Create Oneself,” 85–86; emphasis added.

her desire to bridge the gap between self and other, is in effect a reaction to, and
an avoidance of, the more demanding recognition that it is our separateness that
generates the possibility of our communication. Newman’s own statement bears
quoting on this point:
I hope that my painting has the impact of giving someone, as it did
me, the feeling of his own totality, of his own separateness, of his own
individuality, and at the same time of his connection to others, who are
also separate. And this problem of our being involved in the sense of self
which also moves in relation to other selves . . . the disdain for the self
is something I don’t quite understand.71

70. Cf. Fischer, Stanley Cavell and Literary Skepticism, 77.
71. Newman, “Interview with David Sylvester” (1965),
257–58, ellipsis in original.
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completely with the painting that he loses his sense of himself, as if merging with
it, there winds up being no difference between the two. Schjeldahl’s powerful
identification — does it indicate a disdain for autonomy? — contrasts sharply with
what Bochner has to say. As an artist, Bochner recognizes the separation between
the viewer and the artwork (“the self of the painting”) and thus acknowledges his
position as one facing an other. And it is only this sense of separation that can
secure any notion of pictorial address.
There is another way to interpret the experience of a viewer who, as represented by Schjeldahl, loses himself in Vir Heroicus Sublimis — who in beholding it claims to experience a moment of union with the painting. It might seem
that such a moment is underwritten by an authentic belief in the power of art
to produce the kinds of sublime or transcendent experience often claimed for
Newman’s work generally. (These claims have done much damage to the critical
evaluation of what Newman was really after.) But consider an alternative interpretation. Consider that such a belief, or desire for union, may be generated to
compensate for a more difficult realization or truth: the other really is other, and
so unmediated access is impossible. The dream, or the illusion, of seeing Newman’s canvases as obliterating the divide between viewer (subject) and painting
(object) is an evasion or avoidance; it is an expression of willful resistance to the
responsibility that is entailed whenever one’s subject position — the sense of one’s
separateness — is not lost, but rather maintained, while facing another. For, in
that position, the viewer must necessarily acknowledge that the painting does
not open itself up automatically to our understanding, any more than another
person would, and that it must instead be interpreted and understood, by us, from
within our present contingent circumstances.70 A viewer’s wish for immediacy,
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Newman’s Self-evidence
Newman considered a painting to be “a very particular thing” and thought that
the “impact” of facing an artwork for the first time was “no different, really, from
one’s feeling a relation to meeting another person.”72 Relationships are important; at the same time, though, he hoped that a viewer’s experience of facing his
paintings would yield her a recognition of her own autonomy. That recognition
is produced by the onlooker’s sense of his or her place within the sensation of
complete space that the artwork achieves: “He knows he’s there, so he’s aware of
himself.”73 Newman worried about the problem of achieving one’s self under the
constant pressure to accept a readymade model of identity imparted by one’s culture. As part of their resistance to fifties’ conformism, many artists and art critics
cultivated individual identities, along with the stories of struggle and anxiety that
usually accompanied them.74 But those identities tended to be group identities,
just as the stories tended to be culturally determined, so much so that individuality might seem to be just another artificial construct.75
As an alternative approach, Newman concerned himself with the discovery
of his own “terrible and constant” self.76 But how to distinguish the authentic
constant self from one’s superficial social identity? During a three-day symposium of artists and critics held at Studio 35 in 1950, the conversation turned to
naming the kinds of painting being done at midcentury. Robert Motherwell,
the moderator, proffered three: “Abstract-Expressionist; Abstract Symbolist;
Abstract-Objectionist.” Newman counterproposed “Self-evident.”77 The term is
used to denote unprovable yet undeniable axiomatic truths, but, in Newman’s
usage, it connotes that which is actually present, conspicuous, or manifest, with
no proof required. The name that he suggested also implies, though, that his
works render the “terrible and constant” self of the viewer evident to him- or

72. Newman, “Interview with David Sylvester,” 259.
73. Newman, “Interview with David Sylvester,” 257.
74. Fred Orton interprets Harold Rosenberg’s identification of a group of “action painters” in these terms (see
Rosenberg, “The American Action Painters,” Art News
[December 1952]: 22 – 23, 48 – 50). Orton notes: “Action
painting, for Rosenberg, was painting about the possibility of radical change that had not happened in the 1930s
and 1940s. . . . [Although] action painting could not compensate at the symbolic level for the fact that the political action which would redefine the proletariat did not, at
that moment, seem to be available to it as a class[,] . . . the
action painters glimpsed that that failure was not total”
(Orton, “Action, Revolution, Painting,” Oxford Art Journal 14, no. 2 [1991]: 3).
75. On this point, Shiff, in his study of Brice Marden,
notes: “Many cultural critics . . . regard the self as ideologically determined at its core, if it even has a core,

an essence. We have become inured to thinking that
the self is constructed rather than experientially self-
forming — or, if self-forming, that social institutions filter
all experience and frame the process. If the individual is
a product of social forces, an ‘expression’ of the patterns
of behavior and emotional states those forces induce, then
self-e xpression will have been compromised from the
start. It can operate only within boundaries established
by the social discourse. Each individual becomes a type,
a social identity, an image for someone else’s eye.” Richard Shiff, “Force of Myself Looking,” in Plane Image: A
Brice Marden Retrospective, ed. Gary Garrels (New York:
Museum of Modern Art, 2006), 34.
76. Newman, “From Exhibition of the United States of
America” (1965), in BN:SWI, 187.
77. For an edited transcript of the symposium, see Robert Motherwell, ed., Modern Artists in America (New York:
Wittenborn Schultz, 1950), 9–22.
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Sylvester: I think that one does get the feeling in front of your paintings
of valuing one’s own being, a certain sense of exhilaration in one’s own
being. One also has a sense of the otherness of the painting, which is
a separate presence from oneself. Obviously, people do find cause for
resentment in the fact that there are other entities in the world other
than themselves. And the acceptance of the otherness of others is an
important step.

•

Newman: One thing that I am involved in about painting is that the
painting should give man a sense of place: that he knows he’s there, so
he’s aware of himself. In that sense he relates to me when I made the
painting because in that sense I was there. . . .

Schreyach

herself. Through their scale and modes of pictorial address, Newman’s paintings
both establish their own self-evidence and make evident to each viewer the self
that is authentically his.
I have suggested that the achievement of self is a precondition for acknowledgment of the other. In his interview with Newman, David Sylvester suggested
there might be an even more fundamental condition:

Newman: Yes.78

Newman recognized, with some prompting from Sylvester, that separateness is
also a condition for acknowledgment. His pictorial space simultaneously respects
our condition of separateness and allows us to establish our places in relation to
it. Recall the photograph of two people looking at Vir Heroicus Sublimis, taken
at Newman’s retrospective in 1958: the image was so important to him that he
soon restaged the pose, this time with himself and another individual looking
obliquely at Cathedra. That picture shows each of us not only how to look at a
Newman painting but also how to look with others.79
Note that Sylvester emphasizes not just the “otherness of others” but the
acceptance of its being so. That acceptance — the willingness to face a divide
between the self and the other — is a positive step toward “valuing one’s own
being” and becoming “exhilarat[ed]” by it. Why? Perhaps the exhilaration results
from the prospect of sharing our experience or world with others, of communicating or expressing it to them, once we have embraced the divide itself as
constitutive of relationship. Along these lines, Charles Palermo, in a discussion
of “presentness” in modernist art, poignantly suggests that
sharing a “here” and a “now” [which, recall, are titles of Newman paintings] would mean sharing a world — sharing even our finitude and our
separateness. And sharing such things would mean more than merely
78. Newman, “Interview with David Sylvester,” 257–58.

79. I thank Mark Schlesinger for sharing this and other
insights with me.
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being subjected to them together — as we all are — but would also mean
acknowledging them together, expressing our experience of them to
one another.80

The structure of such meaningful relationships is given in or expressed by the
structure of acknowledgment evident in Newman’s works generally. But, of
course, different modes of acknowledgment occur in beholding various of Newman’s paintings. It is not as if each instance of acknowledgment is the same. Each
painting reveals or calls for a certain mode of acknowledgment, recognizable to
us by virtue of its correspondence with some mode or form we have experienced
in our lives with other people: in our suspicions of or openness to them, for
instance, or in our excitement or apprehension toward them. Or else a painting
may call for a new mode, one unanticipated by us and therefore deploying a creative power in our lives.81

Conclusion
When Harold Rosenberg in 1948 challenged Newman to explain the meaning
of his paintings, the artist replied that to understand even one of his paintings
properly would mean “the end of all state capitalism and totalitarianism.”82 In
another context, he added that his painting was “an open painting, in the sense
that it represent[s] an open world — to that extent, . . . [it] does denote the possibility of an open society, of an open world, not of a closed institutional world.”83
Adrian Lewis argues that Newman’s work projects a “utopian image of freedom”
through which artists become unwitting models for human possibilities in an
era of concentrating state power.84 I would add that coming to understand Newman’s scale — think of it now as a form of life centering on modes of acknowledgment — might facilitate the end of any social organization that is based on
dogmatic principles.
Newman thought that, on some level, Untitled 2, 1950 and the other thin
vertical works had not been well understood. His pessimism had its roots in his
own professional failure — or rather, in the failure of professionals to recognize
what he was struggling to achieve. In April 1952, Newman was excluded from
Fifteen Americans, a Museum of Modern Art exhibition that included work by
Mark Rothko, Jackson Pollock, Clyfford Still, and other contemporaries. The
80. Palermo, Fixed Ecstasy, 187.

82. Newman, “ ‘Frontiers of Space,’” 251.

81. It might be suggested that modernism as a whole
reveals the structure of acknowledgment that obtains in
the beholder-painting relationship as a resource for its
self-reflexive analysis, and that a crucial task remaining is
to delineate the particular forms of acknowledgment that
are created through this analysis.

83. Newman, “Interview with Emile de Antonio,” 308.
84. Adrian Lewis, “Barnett Newman, Abstract Expressionism, and American Cultural Conventions,” in Representing and Imagining America, ed. Philip John Davies
(Keele, UK: Keele University Press, 1996), 160–69.

But if that critique is to take effect, if it is to lead to a beneficial transformation in
behavior or thought or feeling — if, that is, it is to lead to authentic communication — the critique must be acknowledged as valid. To do so is more than just a
matter of experiencing a sensation of space, although the various ways in which
his paintings create space, and allow a viewer to establish a place within it, are
important. “I want to make it clear,” Newman said, “that I never set out to paint
space-domes per se. I am, I hope, involved in much more.”88 That “much more”
is what matters. The test of Newman’s success in achieving it — or rather, our
success in achieving it in the face of his paintings — lies in whether or not we, the
viewers to whom the criticism is directed, accept its truth.

85. Thomas Hess, “Where US Extremes Meet,” Art News
51, no. 2 (1952): 16–19, 65–66.
86. Newman, “Letter to Alfonso Ossorio” (1953), in
BN:SWI, 198.
87. Cavell notes: “The concept of acknowledgment is evidenced equally by its failure as by its success. It is not a
description of a given response but a category in terms of
which a given response is evaluated. A ‘failure to know’
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rebuff wounded him. Thomas Hess, not yet the champion of Newman’s work
that he would become, compounded the insult in a lengthy review of the show, in
which he singled out Newman — despite his exclusion — as the chief theorist of
contemporary “extremists” in painting.85 Soon after, Newman bought back Untitled 1, 1950 (BNF 39) — the first of the sequence of narrow vertical paintings —
from Alfonso Ossorio and wrote to him that “I have decided to withdraw all of
my ‘small’ canvases at this time from public view. . . . The conditions do not yet
exist . . . that can make possible a direct, innocent attitude toward an isolated
piece of my work.”86 Newman may have understood that their failure was a consequence of viewers not acknowledging the paintings’ modes of pictorial address.
Simply put, it was the viewers who had failed, not the paintings.
Insofar as Newman’s work is understood as an attempt to transform the
possibilities for how viewers respond to a mode of pictorial address, his paintings
can be seen to criticize our usual evasions of knowing ourselves (and others).87

might just mean a piece of ignorance, an absence of something, a blank. A ‘failure to acknowledge’ is the presence of
something, a confusion, an indifference, a callousness, an
exhaustion, a coldness. Spiritual emptiness is not a blank”
(“Knowing and Acknowledging,” 263–64).
88. Newman, “ ‘Frontiers of Space,’” 250.

